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North Carolina's comprehensive open-meetings statute,' enacted in
1971, has occasioned considerable interest from the public officials
subject to it, frequent articles and editorials in the press, and at least a
dozen lawsuits alleging violations of its provisions.2 Largely because of
the regard paid the Act by the press, it has become a highly visible part
of governmental processes in the state. Unfortunately, the Act is not
clearly drafted; as a result, problems frequently arise that are not easily
resolved, and markedly divergent interpretations of the Act have
emerged.' Much of this disagreement arises from basic differences in
the methods of statutory interpretation brought to particular situations.
One method, sometimes labeled the "literal" approach,4 involves looking
closely at the words of the statute, seeking to draw out their "obvious"
meaning. An alternative approach is to interpret the words of the Act
in the context of the purposes it seeks to serve.5
t Associate Professor of Public Law and Government, Institute of Government,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina; A.B., Princeton University; LL.B., Harvard University.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 to -318.7 (1974).
2. See, e.g., cases cited notes 27, 66 & 67 infra.
3. See notes 5 & 67 infra.
4. See generally 2A C. SANDS, Su=IAN'S STATuTES AND SrATUToRY CON-
SahUCTION §§ 46.01-.07 (4th ed. 1973).
5. An example from the open-meetings statute should help to make the distinction
clear. The statute permits governmental boards to hold closed meetings to "consider
information regarding. . . an employee or officer under the jurisdiction" of the board.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(b) (1974) (emphasis added). It has been suggested that
the italicized language limits the exception to meetings in which there are discussions
concerning officers or employees whom the board itself has power to appoint, discipline
or remove, so that a city council could not hold a closed session to discuss the firing of
the fire chief if the power to fire that official rested solely with the city manager. This
interpretation is urged by the attorney for the North Carolina Press Association. Raleigh
News and Observer, May 10, 1974, at 42, col. 1. Such an interpretation argues that
"jurisdiction" means "power to hire, fire, or discipline." Another interpretation, how-
ever, would begin with the purposes of the exception: to avoid embarrassment to the
person being discussed and, perhaps, as a corollary, to permit freer discussion by the
board itself. It makes little difference to the person being discussed whether the board
has formal power to take personnel actions: the discussion would be no less embarrassing
in either event. Understanding the purposes involved suggests a broader meaning for the
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It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that a consistent use
of the second approach, one working within the context of the statutory
purposes, will yield sounder results than would use of the first approach.
A literal approach to statutory interpretation forgets both the nature of
language and the realities of the legislative process in North Carolina.
Language is but a tool to convey meanings, and often an imperfect one.
A person's thoughts are frequently more complex than his ability to
express them. His words simply approximate his full meaning. To
understand the full meaning, we must look not only to the words
,themselves but also to their context. With legislation, context includes
an appreciation of the purposes the words seek to express.
Take a simple word like "street." We all know what a street is,
and so there should be no difficulties in interpreting the word in a
statutory context. Or do we? Or at least does the word always carry
the same meaning? Does "street," for example, include the sidewalk
running alongside the vehicular roadway? We shall see that different
statutes with different purposes provide different answers.
Section 136-41.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes allocates
to cities the proceeds of one cent of the state's nine-cent gasoline tax, to
be used, according to section 136-41.3, for constructing and maintain-
ing public streets in the cities. Because the latter section contains no
definition of "streets," the general practice has been to rely on opinions
of the Attorney General to define the permissible uses of these state
street-aid funds. Beginning with a 1955 opinion,6 the Attorney Gener-
al's office has ruled that sidewalks are not a part of streets for purposes
of section 136-41.3, and, therefore, street-aid funds may not be expend-
ed for sidewalk construction and maintenance.
However, the right-of-way of a "street" is generally agreed to
include the land necessary for both roadway and sidewalk.7 Section
160A-299 of the General Satutes sets forth a procedure under which a
city can permanently close an unused right-of-way, returning title to the
abutting landowners. The procedure extends only to "streets" and
"alleys"; no mention is made of sidewalks. Yet certainly no one would
argue that only that portion of the "street" to have been used for a
word "jurisdiction"--that is, the "power to legislate" concerning the office or position
under consideration. Under the second interpretation, the city council could in closed
session consider the firing of the fire chief.
6. Letter from Attorney General to J.L. Womack, City Manager of Reidsville,
N.C., June 6, 1955, on file in University of North Carolina Institute of Government
library.
7. Ham v. City of Durham, 205 N.C. 107, 107-08, 170 S.E. 137, 138 (1933).
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roadway may be closed under the procedure. The entire "street,"
including that portion needed for sidewalks, would be closed.
The different purposes of the two statutes justify a difference in
meaning in the common word "street." The first specifies the uses that
may be made of monies derived from the gasoline tax, and in that
context a limitation of "street" to the roadway, the way open for
vehicular travel, is not nonsensical. The second, however, seeks to
provide a method for clearing the records of streets dedicated to the
public but never opened; since the original dedicated "street" will often
have included land for sidewalks, so too should the street that is closed
include that land. The statutes serve different purposes, create different
contexts, and therefore invest the word "street" with different meanings.
In addition to ignoring the vagaries of language, a literal approach
to statutory interpretation ignores the methods of legislation in North
Carolina. Until quite recently, the General Assembly has not employed
its own professional staff. Bills were drafted by the Attorney General's
staff, by attorneys for local governments, by lobbyists, or by legislators.
Although most bills were probably drafted by attorneys, the draftsmen
were usually without special training or experience in legislative drafting
and were often too hurried to use what special skills they did have. In
addition many statutes contain provisions inserted as floor amendments,
in the midst of debate and in response to very particular problems that
arose during debate. Often such amendments are hurriedly drafted,
frequently by persons without legal training; and if the amendment
solves the problem posed, it is normally accepted without concern for
other implications. Here, especially, language only approximates mean-
ing.
The open-meetings statute is a product of this legislative process.
Two bills were introduced in the 1971 house and were consolidated by a
house subcommitte into one committee substitute, which itself was
amended. on the floor of the house. In the senate, the bill again went to
a subcommittee which produced another committee substitute, but one
that continued the substance and much of the language of the final
house product. On the senate floor further amendments were added,
and the final senate product was accepted by the house. The only stage
at which professional drafting of any sort was used was at the outset,
and the final statute bears little resemblance to those two original bills.8
8. The two bills were H. 51 and H. 113, which were combined under H. 51. The
progress of the latter through the General Assembly is charted in H. JouR., 119711 N.C.
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Under these circumstances it disserves the General Assembly to
insist on a literal reading of the statute, to divorce meaning from context
and from the policies behind the various provisions of the statute. Our
supreme court has from time to time invoked an approach to statutory
interpretation that does acknowledge statutory purpose and seeks mean-
ing in the context of purpose. Mullens v. Town of Louisburg,' for
example, involved the question whether section 143-129 of the General
Statutes, which allowed cities, among other governmental bodies, to
purchase "apparatus, supplies, materials, or equipment" costing more
than $1,000 only after advertising for and receiving sealed bids, extend-
ed to the purchase of electric power from a power company. Rather
than assaying whether a dictionary definition of "supplies" included
electric current, the court looked first to the purposes of the purchasing
statute: "to prevent favoritism, corruption, fraud, and imposition in
the award of public contracts, . . . assuring competition which in turn
guarantees fair play and reasonable prices."'10 In this instance, no
competition between bidders was possible, since, because of state regula-
tion, "there could be but one bidder who could name only the rate or
price" fixed by the Utilities Commission." Because the purposes of the
statute were not involved in such transactions, the court held that
contracts to purchased electric energy were not subject to it.
Another example was In re Yelton.'2 State constitutions frequent-
ly contain provisions that are statutory in their detail, attempts by one
generation to extend its public policies to later generations. North
Carolina's constitution is no exception. One such provision has been
the prohibition on dual officeholding, which becomes statutory with the
detail of its exceptions.' 3 At the time of World War II, one of the
exceptions was for "officers in the militia." Yelton raised the question
whether that language permitted a state officer to accept a commission
in the United States Army for the duration of the war without violating
General Assembly 55, 294, 313-14, 321-22, 954, 963, 1029; S. Jout., [1971] N.C.
General Assembly 188, 515, 520, 527, 545, 551-52, 556-57.
The Institute of Government provides a reporting service for each session of the
General Assembly. In doing so, the Institute receives a copy of each bill introduced and
each amendment and committee substitute offered; these are placed on file in the
Institute library. By comparing the house and senate journals with this original bill file,
the passage of a bill through the legislature can be exactly reconstructed.
9. 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945).
10. Id. at 58-59, 33 S.E.2d at 487.
11. Id. at59, 33 S.E.2d at 488.
12. 223 N.C. 845,28 S.E.2d 567 (1944).
13. The present provision is found in N.C. CoNsT. art. VI, § 9.
780 [Vol. 54
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the dual-officeholding prohibition. Following the same approach as in
Mullens, the court looked to the purposes of the militia exception, saw
that they were equally applicable to an officer in the regular army
during wartime, and therefore read "militia" to include the regular
armed forces of the United States. Such a reading did not stretch
"militia" beyond meaning, but it was certainly not the only possible
reading of the word.14
It is the frame of mind exemplified by these two cases that one
should bring to the open-meetings statute. The statute begins with a
declaration of legislative policy and a blanket requirement that meetings
of governmental groups be open. Then follows a series of exceptions to
the blanket requirement, either for certain subjects or for certain kinds
of groups. Both the initial requirement of openness and the subsequent
exceptions to that requirement should be read within both the general
context of concerns that led to the legislation and the particular context
of concerns that led to each exception. The detailed analysis of the
statute that follows attempts to interpret its provisions sympathetically to
the purposes behind each of them-both the requirement to open the
doors and the permission to close them.
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF OPENNESS
A. Groups Covered
Three alternative tests establish what groups are subject to the
statute. A group with authority to "conduct hearings," to "deliberate"
or to "act as [a body] politic and in the public interest!' is subject to the
statute.15  This is very broad coverage. Authority to act as a body
politic presumably includes not only such powers as adopting ordi-
nances, levying taxes, fixing charges and resolving disputes, but also the
basic power to take final action on any sort of public business, such as
hiring or firing employees, purchasing property, and establishing operat-
ing policies. Most groups authorized to take action also enjoy authority
to conduct hearings, but this second test would extend the statute's
coverage to groups that hold hearings as a means of gathering informa-
tion to formulate recommendations to other groups or to officials. Local
planning commissions frequently do this, as do committees of groups
14. The present dual officeholding provision codifies the result of the Yelton case.
It excepts "any officer of the military forces of the State or of the United States not on
active duty for an extensive period of time." N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.318.2 (1974).
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that may take action. Finally, authority to deliberate brings in any
group not covered by one of the other two tests. To deliberate means
nothing more than to discuss, to consider together with a view toward
deciding a matter before the group. It is difficult to think of a group
that would not have authority to take action, to conduct hearings, or to
deliberate. What other reason could there be for the group's existence?
The statute's statement of policy indicates an intention that it
extend to groups that "administer the legislative and executive functions
of this State and its political subdivisions."'1 6 What is meant by "execu-
tive"? Does the statute, for example, extend to a staff committee (com-
prising the budget officer, public works director, and finance officer)
established by a city manager to review projects proposed by city
departments for inclusion in the city's five-year capital improvement
plan? Typically such a plan would be reviewed by the manager and
perhaps by the planning commission and then adopted by the governing
board. Even then it would be simply a plan, not a binding commit-
ment. Such a committe exercises executive functions'1 and possesses
authority to deliberate, to talk over what it is doing. It would seem to
be covered. Yet common sense disputes such a conclusion. It is
suggested below that implicit in the statute is a requirement of public
notice of meetings.18  Such a requirement is simply impractical when
applied to an ad hoc group of the sort described. The group will often
meet on short notice, when the participants can free themselves from
regular duties, and normally in the office of one of the members.
Obviously, these practical considerations can be carried too far: the
same things might be said of a special meeting of a school board or town
council. But the staff committee's work is buried several layers deep in
the decision-making process. Its proposals will be reviewed by others
before they finally go to the body with power to act. These circum-
stances cause us to seek some other meaning for "executive."1 9
16. Id. § 143.318.1 (emphasis added).
17. It might be argued that such a group is involved in policy formulation and not
policy execution, and thus is not exercising executive functions. However, that would
lead to characterizing the group's work as legislative, which does not answer the problem.
Moreover, its work would be done in the context of policies set by its city council and
would be concerned with furthering those policies. Thus, the work is executive in a
broad sense.
18. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
19. In People ex rel. Cooper v. Carlson, 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 328 N.E.2d 675(1975), the Illinois open-meetings act, which extends to "legislative, executive, adminis-
trative, or advisory bodies," was held not to govern weekly meetings of the five division
heads of the Kane County development department. The "group" involved had not been
established nor authorized by any statute or ordinance.
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Many groups in state and local government-commissions, boards,
authorities-cannot accurately be described as "legislative. ''20  Rather,
they operate public facilities, enforce statutes and regulations, adminis-
ter public programs, and so on. They can best be characterized as
administrative agencies. I believe that the word "executive" was used to
clearly include these agencies under the statute. They are formal
bodies, with continuing responsibilities, established by action of a legis-
lative body. These characteristics are sufficient to distinguish them
from the kind of informal, ad hoc group described above, established by
an administrator to help develop and carry out policy.
B. Official Meetings
If a group is subject to the law, all of its "official meetings" must
be open unless the meeting fits within one of the exceptions discussed
below. The definition of "official meeting" tracks the three tests estab-
lishing the groups subject to the law: an official meeting occurs whe-
never a majority of the members of a group get together to conduct
hearings, deliberate, or vote on or otherwise transact public business.21
There should be no problem in deciding whether a group has gathered
to take action or conduct a hearing; problems do arise, however, when
the question is whether a group is deliberating. Many local governing
boards hold sessions variously characterized as agenda meetings, work
sessions, or the like. Sometimes these meetings are merely for addition-
al discussion by board members of matters before the board. The
discussion can proceed more informally than would be possible in a
formal meeting, and perhaps members of the administrative staff might
join the discussion. Other times these meetings function mainly to elicit
information, with presentations from the staff and questions by board
members. Another type of meeting is the "retreat"-the board, a few
staff members and perhaps consultants, get together very informally to
discuss some matter in a general way. Often such a meeting will most
20. Some are best characterized as both legislative and executive. For example,
city councils and boards of county commissioners exercise both types of functions on the
local level, while the Wildlife Resources Commission does so at the state level.
21. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974). In early 1975 the author had a chance
conversation with a member of the committee that developed the house committee substi-
tute for the open meetings bill. He reported that one of the most important changes
made in the substitute from the original bill was the limitation of the statute's coverage
to "official" meetings. He reported that the addition of "official" was intended to restrict
the law's coverage. He was surprised, but pleased, that no one had noticed the change on
the house floor and stressed its importance to me. He didn't realize, however, that the
change was noticed in the senate, and the definition of "official meeting" added.
1976]
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resemble a seminar. Do any of these more or less informal sessions
involve "deliberations" within the meaning of the statute?
Surely the informal discussion of a matter before the board consti-
tutes deliberation. The members are discussing specific public business
with a view toward eventual decision. That the discussion is conducted
without the parliamentary trappings of a formal meeting should not
make it any less a deliberation. On the other side, the retreat or
seminar probably does not constitute deliberation. The participants are
not working on any particular matter of public business but rather are
expanding their store of background knowledge. Unresolved, however,
is the middle case, the session to gather information regarding a specific
matter now or soon to be before the board.
Here one might consider some of the possible purposes served by
the open-meetings statute. An obvious one is to set before the public
the voting record of members of groups covered by the statute. That
purpose, however, could be satisfied by a simple requirement that all
actions be taken in open session, and the North Carolina statute goes
further than that. Its extension to deliberations indicates at least the
additional purpose that the public have some indication why officials
vote as they do. This purpose compels opening up the informal discus-
sion meeting but does not resolve the question of the informational
meeting. The inclusion of deliberations under the law may also suggest
a third purpose-to educate the public concerning the factual basis of
and the issues involved in any public question. Discussions among
board members will not only set forth their reasons for voting as they do
but often will publicize many of the facts on which those reasons are
based. In addition, hearings also constitute official meetings, and a
hearing often serves to educate the public as much as it does to permit
the public to express their sentiments to the board. If, then, this
educational or publicizing function is recognized as a purpose served by
the statute, an informational meeting should be understood as an essen-
tial element of the deliberative process and be covered by the statute.22
22. In Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors,
263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (3d Dist. 1968), the court held that California's
open meeting statute, the Brown Act, extended to a meeting that involved only delibera-
tions, in that case a luncheon. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted:
Recognition of deliberation and action as dual components of the collective
decision-making process brings awareness that the meeting concept cannot be
split off and confined to one component only, but rather comprehends both and
either. To "deliberate" is to examine, weigh and reflect upon the reasons for
or against the choice. . . . Public choices are shaped by reasons of fact, rea-
sons of policy or both. Any of the agency's functions may include or depend
784 [Vol. 54
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An official meeting takes place whenever a majority of a board's
members gather together to act, hold a hearing, or deliberate.23 For
almost all boards that number is also a quorum, and perhaps the specific
reference to a majority of members means nothing more than a board
meeting at which a quorum is present. Yet on its face -the reference
may mean a good deal more than that. The exact language is that
"every. . . gathering together at any time or place of a majority of the
members [of a group under the statute] for the purpose of...
participating in deliberations" constitutes an official meeting. Where
does that leave a luncheon of three of five members of a town board, at
which they discuss a proposed Sunday-closing ordinance? What if the
conversation is unplanned? They are a majority, and they seem to be
deliberating. In Florida, such a meeting seemingly would be considered
subject to that state's open-meetings law.24 Yet such a result intrudes
very far into an official's ability to lead a normal life. In addition, any
requirements of notice implicit in the statute could not be met, at least
not with an accidental meeting.
These practical considerations argue that the statute extends only
to meetings that are meetings of the board itself and not to informal
gatherings of some members. Of course, abuse would then be
possible: the three members may decide at lunch on a common course
of action, thereby effectively deciding the issue without public observa-
tion of the process. They may even constitute a permanent caucus and
proceed that way on all issues. The proper response to that sort of
abuse would lie, however, in the enforcement process rather than the
interpretational process. The statute permits "social meeting[s] or
other informal assembl[ies]," unless called or held to evade the spirit
and purposes of the statute. That permission would seem to allow
normal social contact among board members, plus some informal dis-
upon the ascertainment of facts. ... . Deliberation thus connotes not only
collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and exchange of facts pre-
liminary to the ultimate decision.
Id. at -, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974).
24. In 1972 the Charlotte (Florida) County Commission appointed a three-mem-
ber committee (two commission members and the county appraiser) to recommend one
of two firms to conduct a county property reappraisal. The two commission members
visited Tennessee to interview customers of the two firms and, while there, agreed that
one of the two firms was preferable. On their return they met with a representative of
the preferred firm in a motel dining room to clarify several points. After the contract
was awarded, the losing firm sought to enjoin its enforcement because of violations of
the Florida open-meetings law. In Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Ct. App.
1974), a district court of appeals held that the Tennessee discussions and the motel
discussions did violate the Florida law and held the contract void.
19761 785
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cussion of issues before the board, yet still prohibit a majority caucus
from deciding matters away from public observation.
C. Public Notice of Meetings
By its terms the statute prohibits closed meetings, as opposed to
secret meetings. That is, it prohibits denying a citizen access to a
meeting required to be open, but it does not, on its face, require that the
citizen be told that the meeting will be held. Nor do other statutes
generally require public notice of meetings of public bodies, especially
of special meetings. For example, section 160A-71, which applies to
cities, permits a special meeting of a city council merely upon notice to
each member. Even those statutes that do require public notice may
not apply to all meetings subject to the open meetings law. 25  Counties,
for example, are required to give public notice before special meetings
of the county commissioners." But arguably, "meeting" in that statute
refers to meetings at which action may be taken, and a special session
called simply to discuss a matter might not be covered, even though it
normally must be open.
Yet to argue that the statute proscribes only closed meetings and
permits secret meetings as long as they are "open" is to argue that the
General Assembly enacted an illusion. The basic purpose of the open-
meetings law is to permit the public to attend meetings of public
bodies-to learn what boards are doing, to learn why they are doing it,
and perhaps to affect the substance of public action by the mere
pressure of public attendance. To permit secret meetings, so long as no
one is turned away, would strike at the heart of that basic purpose. The
answer is to take an expansive view of the statute's requirement that
meetings be "open" and that persons not be "denied access" to meetings.
A meeting cannot be considered open if it is unknown, and a denial of
access occurs not only when someone is physically barred at the door,
but also when only members of a group know of its meeting.2 7
25. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-40(b) (1974).
26. Id.
27. A requirement of notice has already been introduced by at least two superior
courts. In Weathers v. Shelby Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 75 CVS 290 (Cleveland
County Super. Ct., July 16, 1975), the court concluded that the open meetings require-
ment included a "reasonable opportunity for the public to know of the time and place" of
meetings. Therefore, the court ordered the defendant (1) to give six hours' notice to the
news media of each special meeting, (2) to post notice of each special meeting on the
door of the Shelby ABC store, and (3) to give notice of each special meeting to any
person requesting notification. In News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Bd. of
Educ. for Wake County, 75 CVS 6299 (Wake County Super. Ct., Dec. 31, 1975), the
[Vol." 54786
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I1. EXEcUTIVE SESSIONS FOR SELECTED ToPiCs
A. Introduction
The first two sections of the open-meetings act assert a broad right
of public access to the meetings of state and local government agencies.
Countervailing policies exist, however, based primarily oil concern for
personal privacy and reputation and for protection of the interests of the
units and agencies themselves when in adversary situations. These
policies, too, are recognized in the statute, through its exceptions.2 8
The Act permits closed meetings in eight subject-matter areas,
listed in section 143-318.3 of the General Statutes. Before turning to
the individual exceptions, two problems that affect the entire section
must be addressed.
The introductory language of subsection (a) sets out a procedure
for calling executive sessions: a board may, during a regular or special
meeting, vote to go into an executive session of that meeting; presuma-
bly the vote itself will occur in open session. But subsection (a) lists
only five of the subjects for which an executive session may be held. The
other three are authorized in subsections (b) and (c), where the
procedures of subsection (a) do not on their face apply. The distinc-
tion does have some minor importance. If a board must vote to enter
an executive session and do so during an open meeting, then the public,
either through attendance at the open meeting or later examination of
the board's minutes, will at least know that an executive session took
place and if the motion states the purpose of the session, will know
generally what was to be discussed. Otherwise, there may be no public
evidence of a closed meeting.
Subsection (a) goes on to state that the executive session may be
held "while considering" any of the five listed subjects. Does the use of
the word "considering" constitute a limitation, one that permits consid-
eration but, impliedly, prohibits taking binding action in executive
session? Subsections (b) and (c) again differ from (a) and do not
court reached the same conclusion and issued a preliminary injunction requiring forty-
eight hours' posted notice of any meeting. In addition, the tendency in other states has
been to read such a notice requirement into open meetings statutes. E.g., Sullivan v.
Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502 (1974).
28. In recognizing that closed meetings may sometimes be in the public interest,
the Act has profited from the lessons of its only immediate predecessor. Before
adoption of the present Act, the only comprehensive open-meetings statute applied to city
councils and contained no exceptions. Law of Mar. 6, 1917, ch. 136-XIII, § l(b),
[1917] N.C. Sess. Laws 200. It was widely violated, and certainly the lack of reasoned
exceptions was in part responsible for those violations.
1976] 787
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contain a comparable limitation-if limitation it is. Subsection (b)
requires that final action on the discharge of an officer or employee take
place in an open meeting, implying that final action on lesser measures,
such as a suspension, need not. And subsection (c) explicitly permits
executive sessions for "considering and taking appropriate action" in
public emergency situations.29 In this context, subsection (a) meetings
might well seem limited to consideration of the listed topics. Yet such a
result makes no sense. -To use subsection (a) (1) as an example, an
executive session may be held "while considering acquisition, lease, or
alienation of property." An obvious purpose of this provision is to
permit a board to instruct its agent in a property negotiation. Those
instructions, such as the final price that may be offered, must remain
secret if they are to be effective. Yet the instructions constitute action.
If the property exception is to be of any use, it must permit both
consideration and decision, and similar points can be made for each of
the subjects listed in subsection (a).30
B. Property Transactions
Several state open-meeting statutes include exceptions for property
transactions,31 but North Carolina's is unique in the literal breadth of its
language. A covered board may meet in executive session "while
considering . . . acquisition, lease, or alienation of property. '3 2 Setting
out a series of situations that arguably fall within the exception should
help clarify the problems it raises:
(1) A board meets to develop a negotiating position regard-
ing property it wishes to buy or sell.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(c) (4974) (emphasis added).
30. In the only three cases found from other states that raise similar questions,
each court gave an expansive reading to "consider." In Lucas v. Board of Trustees, 18
Cal. App. 3d 988, 96 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1st Dist. 1971), the state statute's permission "to
consider the appointment, employment or dismissal of a public officer or employee" in
closed session was held to permit voting for dismissal at such a session. In State ex rel.
Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Board of Appeals, 21 Wisc. 2d 5,16, 124 N.W.2d 809 (1963), the
court held that a board of zoning appeals that was permitted to "deliberate" in executive
session after its public hearing was also permitted to vote on the subject of its
deliberations at such a session. And in School Dist. #10 v. Witte, 5 Il. App. 3d 600,
283 N.E.2d 718 (1972), the court held that a statutory permission to hold a closed
meeting "where the acquisition or sale of property is being considered" permitted a board
to decide to purchase in the closed meeting. Id. at 602, 283 N.E.2d at 720.
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd, Caum. Supp. 1975); IowA Co~n
ANN. § 28A (Cum. Pamphlet 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025.2 (Vernon, Cum. Supp.
1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91A:311(d) (Supp. 1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
66.77(4) (d) (Cam. Supp. 1975).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.3(a)(1) (1974).
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(2) A board meets to decide which parcels of property to
purchase from among several options.
(3) A board meets to decide whether it should continue leas-
ing office space or should acquire its own office building.
(4) A board meets to decide which bid it should accept for
purchase of new automobiles.
(5) A board meets to decide what procedure it should use
in disposing of surplus property: auction, negotiated sale, or sealed
bid.
Each of these situations arguably involves consideration of the
"acquisition, lease, or alienation of property," albeit some more clearly
so than others. Yet, I suspect, the typical first reaction would be that
only the first and possibly the second situation are covered by the
exception.33  But how can it be limited in any sort of principled way,
given the breadth of the language? The answer lies in reading the
exception within the context of its presumed purposes.
In several other open-meetings statutes the purpose of the property-
transaction exception is made explicit. Missouri's, for example, permits
closed meetings to consider the "leasing, purchase or sale of real estate
where public knowledge of the transaction might adversely affect the
legal consideration therefor."3 4 Similarly, Wisconsin's permits closed
meetings when "deliberating or negotiating on the purchasing of public
property, the investing of public funds, or conducting other public
business which for competitive or bargaining reasons require [them]." 35
It seems likely that the same general purpose-saving money for the
public-led to the North Carolina exception. Thus, it is suggested that
the boundaries of the exception be established with reference to this
purpose. If public discussion of a property transaction will weaken the
board's bargaining position or drive up the price it must pay, then the
transaction falls within the exception. Otherwise, it does not.
Returning to the five situations, the first obviously falls within the
exception. Public knowledge of the negotiating position of a govern-
mental agency would impair its bargaining capacities and possibly cause
the agency to pay more or accept less for a piece of property. Situations
33. An argument may be drawn from the statute itself that situation (4), the
award of a contract from a number of bids, is not included within the exception. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(2) (1974) exempts entirely from the act the State Board of
Awards, which awards state contracts. If the property-transaction exception extends to
situation (4), the Board of Award exception would be superfluous. Of course, as a
practical matter, the latter may have been inserted in order to "make sure."
34. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.025.2 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1976).
35. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(4)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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(3) through (5) would normally not involve any potential financial
detriment to the agency if discussed in public and thus would not fall
within the exception. The second situation might go either way, de-
pending on the particular facts. If several parcels must be assembled,
the board may wish to proceed quietly, perhaps even through a straw
person, in order to avoid having one or two owners hold out for
speculative profits. In such a case, closed-meeting discussion of this
procedure would fall within the policy of the exception. On the other
hand, if a board is choosing between several parcels of property with
known prices, the discussion is likely to involve nonfinancial considera-
tions and would not fall within the exception.
The interpretation posed by this analysis leaves much to the initial
discretion of the board involved. Yet, most boards do want to comply
with the statute, and these guidelines should assist them. If a board
abuses its discretion or makes a mistake, later judicial review would
always be available.
C. Employee Negotiations
This exception is like that for property transactions: the govern-
mental unit or agency is involved in a negotiating situation and must be
allowed to develop its position in confidence. The obvious use of this
exception is to permit development of a negotiating position, to hear
reports on proposals of employee representatives, and to decide whether
to accept proposals of employee representatives. The exception could
also extend to the actual negotiations, but since these are normally
conducted by an agent, the law would not apply.
North Carolina law is basically hostile to public employee unioni-
zation. Section 95-97 of the General Statutes prohibits public employ-
ees from joining labor organizations, while section 95-98 prohibits
collective bargaining agreements between governmental units and agen-
cies and employee organizations. In Atkins v. City of Charlotte,"' a
three-judge district court held section 95-97 to be unconstitutional on its
face but upheld section 95-98. a7 Thus, public employees may join
36. 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
37. Id. at 1075-77. In International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. North Carolina Ports
Authority, 463 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972), the Ports Authority was held to be a carrier
subject to the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board. The court of appeals did
not reach the question of whether federal law superseded section 95-98 of the statute as
to the ports authority, but remanded to the district court. The district court did hold
that the Railway Labor Act superseded section 95-98 with regard to the Ports Authority
and certain of its employees. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. North Carolina
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unions, but public employers may not enter into collective bargaining
agreements with those unions. However, the federal court seemed to
assume that bargaining would take place-that was the purpose of
union membership---but that no formal agreement could be reached.
The union would have to rely on the good faith of the employer, rather
than an enforceable contract, to safeguard the results of bargaining. The




The Act establishes a broad, nearly inclusive, exception for matters
dealt with by hospitals and other medical clinics.8 9 Besides hospitals,
the exception extends to public health and mental health clinics. The
primary group benefiting from the exception is the professional staff of
such an institution in its periodic staff meetings; however, the governing
board of an institution and occasionally the governing board of a city or
county funding such an institution might also discuss matters within the
exception.
The primary uncertainty raised by the exception is whether it
extends only to discussions concerning individual patients, employees
and professional staff, or extends also to discussions of policies and other
matters affecting patients, employees, or staff as groups.40 For employ-
ees, and to a slightly lesser extent for professional staff, the language of
the exception indicates the latter interpretation. The exception speaks
of "negotiations, contracts, conditions, . . . [and] regulations...
relating to employees," all clearly matters involving such persons as a
group. It also speaks of "all aspects of hospital management, operation
and discipline relating to professional staff," a phrasing most naturally
referring to these people as a group as well. Regarding patients,
Ports Authority, 370 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.N.C. 1974). After extended negotiation, the
authority signed a contract with the union on June 14, 1974. In Winston-Salem Forsyth
County Unit, N.C. Ass'n of Educators v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974),
another three-judge district court agreed with the Atkins court that section 95-98 was
constitutional, there, as applied to school teachers.
38. Some examples of city-union activity are found in Pfefferkorn, Professional
Negotiations in North Carolina: An Alternative to Formal Collective Bargaining for
Public Employees, 7 WAxE FOREST L. Rnv. 189, 190-97 (1971).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.318.3(a)(3) (1974).
40. The legislative history of the provision suggests that something more than
discussions of specific individuals was intended. As passed by the House, the exception
extended only to "matters dealing with specific patients or employees or members of the
medical staff of a hospital or medical clinic." The much more expansive language of the
final act was added by the senate committee. See note 8 supra.
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however, the language of the statute is neutral. 41 The primary policy of
the patient exception would seem to be protection of individuals from
embarrassment. A hospital staff ought to be able to discuss a person's
illness, the possible treatment and the prognosis, and how much such a
person has been charged and has paid in private session. A comparable
need to discuss patient matters generally-such as procedures of admis-
sion and discharge, of treatments, and of records, and the level of
hospital fees-is not as clear. Particularly with regard to financial
matters, there are strong arguments for discussion and decision in
public. The fees charged by a public institution and the policies on
access and use of the institution are very much public business, and
those paying the fees and financing the institution have a legitimate
interest in how those fees and policies are established. Therefore, the
patient portion of the exception should be limited to matters involving
individual patients.42
E. Privileged Relationships
By privileged relationships, the statute presumably refers to those
relationships that involve privileged communications under North Caro-
lina laws of evidence and to situations within such a relationship involv-
ing a privileged communication.43
For purposes of the open-meetings statute, the most important
privileged relationship is that of attorney and client. The privilege
protects confidential communications from client to attorney, and thus
the exception permits a board to meet with its attorney to discuss a
confidential matter.44 This exception offers significant opportunity for
abuse. The privilege exists to permit unfettered communications be-
41. "All aspects of admission, treatment, and discharge, all medical records, reports
and summaries, and all charges, accounts and credit information pertaining to said
patients. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a) (3) (1974).
42. Obviously, the line between individual and group matters is not always sharp.
In discussing a possible treatment, a staff doctor might illustrate with particular cases.
Certainly if names are used, this falls within the exception.
43. 1 H. BRANDIs, STANsBnuY's NoRTm CAROLINA EvmENcE § 53-65 (1973).
44. In California, an exception for meetings involving privileged communications
within the attorney-client relationship has been read into the open meetings law byjudicial decision. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (3d Dist. 1968). In Arkansas and Florida,
however, courts have refused to create such an exception if none appears in the statute.
Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968); Times Publishing Co. v.
Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969). The Minnesota Supreme Court recently
appeared willing to read in such an exception on a case-by-case basis. Channel 10, Inc.
v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974).
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tween client and attorney and therefore should be the basis of a closed
meeting only when the attorney is present to listen and offer advice. A
board should not use the attorney's mere presence as an excuse to
discuss a matter in closed session when the attorney's legal advice is not
sought, nor should an attorney permit a board to do so.
A more difficult issue is whether the existence of the open-meetings
statute limits the scope of the privilege. The privilege extends only to
confidential communications. A private client enjoys wide discretion in
determining what is confidential and therefore privileged. For the most
part, if a communication is made only to a person's attorney, it is
confidential, and the client may insist upon the privilege. Although
there may be considerations in the law of evidence that counteract the
privilege, 45 no general policy exists that private persons and. associations
should conduct their affairs openly. Such a policy of openness, how-
ever, does apply to public agencies, articulated not only by the open-
meetings statute but also by the common-law and statutory policy that
public records are indeed public and open to inspection.40  This policy
of openness must moderate a public client's discretion in determining
which communications to its attorney are confidential. Otherwise, the
simple desire of a board to discuss a matter in private with the board's
attorney, for whatever reason, might cause the board to characterize the
matter as confidential, thereby seriously undermining the purpose of the
open-meetings statute. Both board members and attorneys should con-
strue the notion of confidentiality narrowly, limiting it to situations in
which the interests of the unit itself, and not merely the political interest
of board members, might be harmed by disclosure. Only rarely should
occasions arise for using the exception that are not also occasions for use
of some other exception, such as those for property negotiation or
litigation. 7
Of the remaining privileged relationships, the one that seems most
likely to prompt a closed session is the qualified privilege that protects
the identity of an informer.48  A board might be approached by an
45. 8 J. WiGMoRE, EvmENCE IN TRIL&S AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974).
47. In the California and Arkansas cases in which the courts were asked to read an
attorney-client privilege exception into an open meetings statute, the proponent's argu-
ment rested heavily on the need for confidentiality in litigation situations. See note 44
supra. North Carolina's statute, of course, contains a separate exception for such
situations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a) (5) (1974).
48. E.g., State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969).
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informer concerning some matter within its jurisdiction; it could meet
with him in closed session in order to protect his identity. Alternatively,
it might discuss an informer's information with the person (for example,
a police officer) who met with the informer. If the board wished to
know the informer's identity, it could go into closed session to hear it.
The information offered by an informer, however, is not within the
privilege.
Three other privileged relationships might occasion properly closed
meetings, but the situations involved are already excepted. First and
second are the physician-patient and companion psychologist-client privi-
leges.49 Occasionally a doctor or psychologist might bring a particular
case before a formal committee or staff meeting of the hospital or clinic
in which he worked, and the discussion might naturally involve matters
within the privilege. More commonly, hospital or clinic procedures
might involve committee review of patient records within the privilege.
The exception would permit these meetings to be closed. However, the
broad hospital-affairs exception would also include these meetings. The
third privilege would be that apparently established for probation offi-
cers." The Probation Commission would be entitled to hear any matters
privileged under this section, but its meetings are separately excepted
from the law.
Two remaining privileged relationships, husband-wife 1 and school
counselor-pupil,52 seem unlikely to raise situations subject to the open-
meetings law. A school board might be interested in some matter
within the latter privilege in connection with a pupil discipline case, but
that would be a proceeding in which the pupil might very well wish to
assert the privilege. In any case, meetings dealing with pupil discipline
are separately excepted.
F. Litigation
Deliberations concerning "judicial action[s] or proceeding[s]" are
excepted from the statute. 53 As with any litigant, a governmental board
49. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 8-53, -53.3 (1969).
50. "All information and data obtained in the discharge of official duty by any
probation officer shall be privileged information, shall not be receivable as evidence in
any court, and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to any other than the judge or
to others entitled under this Article to receive reports, unless and until otherwise ordered
by a judge of the court or the Secretary of Correction." Id. § 15-207 (1975).
51. This common law privilege is continued in id. § 8-56 (1969) (civil actions)
and id. § 8-57 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (criminal actions).
52. Id. § 8-53.4 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
53. Id. § 143-318.3(a)(5) (11974).
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needs to plan litigation strategy in some confidence, and this seems to be
the policy behind the exception.
Governmental bodies and agencies are party to or affected by not
only proceedings before courts but also proceedings before quasi-judi-
cial agencies. Two examples illustrate this. A city might be party to
proceedings before the state Environmental Management Commission
concerning a proposed special order against pollution allegedly caused
by faults in the city's sewage treatment plant.54 A county might be
party to an appeal heard by the state Property Tax Commission con-
cerning the valuation of a particular piece of property. 55 In such
proceedings, the board will want to plan litigation strategy and to be free
to discuss settlement possibilities; the need for doing so in confidence is
as strong here as it is with court proceedings. The policy of the
exception indicates that "judicial action or proceeding" should be read
to include quasi-judicial proceedings as well as those before courts.
In other contexts courts have interpreted "judicial proceedings" to
include noncourt proceedings when the policies involved warranted such
an interpretation. In Jarman v. Offutt5" the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the defense of privilege in libel actions for statements
made in "judicial proceedings" included statements made in mental com-
mitment proceedings before the clerk of superior court. The court
quoted approvingly the statement in Corpus Juris Secundum that "judi-
cial proceedings" include proceedings of a judicial nature before courts
or "tribunals or officers clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial powers." '
The New York Court of Appeals has, in interpreting the same doctrine,
held judicial proceedings to include discipline hearings before a bar as-
sociation grievance committee. 58 The policy behind the privilege de-
fense in both the North Carolina and New York cases was thought to
justify an expansive understanding of "judicial proceedings." So too
in our context, the policy behind the exception justifies a reading of
"judicial action or proceeding' that includes proceedings before adminis-
trative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers.
A second question is whether the exception extends only to pro-
ceedings that have already begun. The language is in the present tense,
54. Id. § 143-215.2 (Culm. Supp. 1975).
55. Id. § 105-290(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
56. 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954).
57. Id. at 472, 80 S.E. 2d at 251.
58. Weiner v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540, 292, N.Y.S.2d 667(1968).
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implying a proceeding already in existence. Yet occasions arise before
litigation begins that demand the same privacy as those occurring during
litigation. For example, a person may have a tort claim against a local
government. The parties might be negotiating the claim in hopes of
preventing a lawsuit. The same requirements of privacy in developing a
negotiating position apply here as they would had the suit already been
filed. The policy of the exception extends to situations in which a
proceeding is imminent.
Unfortunately, this interpretation offers some potential for abuse.
Almost any action a government takes might be subject to subsequent
legal challenge; reguiring the existence of a proceeding establishes
a beginning point for the exception. In situations in which the agency
is the defendant, it may be possible to recognize this difficulty yet
still not completely disallow application of the exception to events be-
fore a formal proceeding is begun. The exception might be admitted
once some sort of formal step preparatory to litigation has been taken.
Two examples will illustrate what is meant. First, section 1-539.15 of
the General Statutes requires any person injured by an alleged tortious
action of a city employee to notify the city within six months after the
event; thirty days must then pass before suit is brought, apparently to
afford time for settlement. Secondly, rule 27 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for taking a deposition to obtain
information for a complaint. The official notice to the city and the
notice served under rule 27 exemplify the kinds of formal pre-proceed-
ing action that might trigger the application of the exception.
When the agency is a potential plaintiff, however, such a reconcili-
ation of interests will not avail. A plaintiff needs to choose between
theories of action and otherwise develop litigation strategy before the
action is begun. Although pre-litigation strategy is normally developed
by an agency's attorney and not in consultation with the agency's board,
there will be times when the board will be involved. In some agencies,
for example, the attorney may be asked to evaluate the proposed action
before the board approves bringing the action. To require all discus-
sion to be open until the action is actually filed would place public
plaintiffs at a disadvantage to private defendants.59
59. The Illinois open-meetings statute carries an exception for meetings considering
pending litigation. In People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger, 30 Ill. App. 3d 525, 33Z N.E.2d
649 (1975) the question was whether this excepted a conference between board and
attorney concerning potential litigation. The exception language was too specific to




Several questions arise under the exception relating -to personnel
matters.60  First, is it an exception at all? Unlike the five exceptions
discussed above, this one is phrased generally as a savings clause: the
open-meetings act is not to prevent a board from meeting in private to
discuss certain personnel matters. The language can be read to assume
that the authorization for such a private meeting is found elsewhere and
simply to assert that the open meetings act does not affect such an
authorization. Under that reading, the authorization would have to
exist elsewhere as well. In its absence, a private meeting on personnel
matters could not be held.
This interpretation is unpersuasive, however. It ignores the legal
situation that existed before the open-meetings statute was enacted. For
most boards, the statutes were silent as to open or closed meetings. In
such a situation, a board was free to hold a private session in its
discretion. No widespread need existed for specific authorizations for
private meetings on any subject. As a result few, if any, such authoriza-
tion existed. (In a nonsystematic search of the General Statutes, the
author found no pre-1971 statutes authorizing private meetings on
personnel matters.) This is as much an exception as the five discussed
above."' If it must be seen as a savings clause, what it saves is the
pre-1971 understanding that the absence of statutory direction was
the equivalent of a statutory authorization of closed meetings. 62
Once the section is accepted as a true exception for personnel
matters, the next set of questions concerns the exception's scope. Here
some notion of the policy behind the exception should be helpful. One
obvious policy-probably the most important-is the protection of indi-
the statute. Any other reading would, the court said, place public bodies at a disadvan-
tage in litigation situations. Id. at 538, 332 N.E.2d at 659.
60. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 143-318.3(b) (1974).
61. The peculiar formulation of this exception dates from the introduction of H.
51. The bill listed several clear exceptions and then went on: "This section (which
required open meetings and listed the exceptions] shall not be construed to prevent
anybody [sic] covered by this section from holding closed sessions to consider informa-
tion regarding appointment, employment or dismissal of an employee or officer or to
hear testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee or officer to determine its
validity." H. 51, 1971 N.C. General Assembly (version Hi). It is not clear why the
draftsman chose this formulation. Perhaps he was using a model from one of several
other states and found this sort of language.
62. This interpretation is reinforced by the second sentence of subsection (b) of H.
51 which in similar language "saves" the right of school boards to hear student
disciplinary cases in closed session. There was not in 1971, and there still is not, any
explicit general law authorization to hold such a meeting in closed session.
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vidual reputations. An employee may have been accused of improper
conduct by a citizen or have been disciplined for such conduct by a
superior. If the employee denies the conduct, the appropriate board
can investigate the matter in a private hearing without publicly embar-
rassing him. Once made, charges are difficult to dislodge from the
public consciousness, even if subsequently disproved. A related policy
may be to insure more careful appointments to public positions, particu-
larly to part-time appointments such as a planning board. Those
making the appointment will feel freer to discuss a candidate's qualifica-
tions or disqualifications if the discussion occurs in private. Thus the
information concerning a candidate may be made more complete. One
might disagree with the force of these policies, but the legislature seems
to have adopted them. The exception was made.
The exception permits closed sessions concerning matters relating
to "employee[s] or officer[s] under the jurisdiction" of the board.
Many boards-- -particularly local boards-appoint a chief administrative
officer who has statutory authority to appoint, discipline, and remove
subordinate employees. The attorney for the North Carolina Press
Association has argued that in such a situation the only employee
"under the jurisdiction" of the board is the chief administrative officer,
and therefore closed sessions may be held only to discuss appointment,
dismissal, etc., of that officer."
This argument takes as its premise that "jurisdiction" means power
to take effective personnel action. Surely this is too narrow a reading of
the word "jurisdiction." It is essentially a lawyer's definition, one
borrowed from a judicial context. A court has jurisdiction over a
matter if it may hear and determine it; lack of power to decide amounts
to lack of jurisdiction. In a governmental context, however, jurisdiction
has a broader meaning-the power to legislate or govern. The open-
meetings statute itself speaks of jurisdiction over the employee or officer,
not over his appointment, discipline, or removal. Even if a board does
not have legal power to appoint an officer or employee, it will typically
have established the position and its compensation and will frequently
have adopted ordinances or policies establishing the duties of the job. In
such a case, the office or position would seem within the board's
jurisdiction.
In addition, boards will often be involved, in practice, in personnel
decisions over which they have no legal jurisdiction in the narrow sense.
63. Raleigh News and Observer, May 10, 1974, at 42, col. 1.
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A city manager may not wish to act without making clear to the council
why a person is being dismissed. Despite the lack of legal power,
boards do hear appeals from employees or from citizens who seek in-
directly to pressure the chief administrator. Finally, boards enjoy gener-
al authority to conduct investigations into the affairs of the unit or
agency they lead, and such an investigation may involve personnel
matters.6 4 The potential for damage to an employee's reputation is not
lessened because the board conducting a hearing is without power to
take action. The policy of the exception is met no less. 65
The argument above is that the exception should apply if the
position is under the board's jurisdiction, even if the actual appointment
or dismissal is not. What about the converse, when the position is not
under the board's jurisdiction, but the appointment is? This situation
occurs when a board is empowered to fill a vacancy in its own member-
ship, as are county and city governing boards. Once the appointment is
made, the position is hardly under the board's jurisdiction. This textual
analysis was adopted by a superior court in Mecklenburg County.66 The
policy of the statute also supports this conclusion. Typically, the only
sort of board that may fill its own vacancies is an elected one. When
a person seeks elective office, he or she must give up some of the privacy
of the private citizen. A candidate's character and finances are, es-
pecially in recent years, as important to the voters as his beliefs. By
running for and serving in public office, a person accepts this intrusion
on privacy. That a person is appointed to such an office does not di-
minish the public's need to know about these matters. People are rarely
appointed to city councils or county commissions without their knowl-
edge or consent. The willingness to accept the appointment should be
64. For example, in the summer and fall of 1974, the High Point City Council
investigated the city's police department-an investigation that involved allegations of
misconduct by particular police officials. See Leak v. High Point City Council, 25 N.C.
App. 394, 213 S.E.2d 386 (1975). If, in such a situation, the council felt the results
demanded the dismissal of certain officials, it would certainly make that known to the
manager, even though the legal power of dismissal rested solely with the manager.
65. Often one board or group is asked, or has the power, to make personnel
recommendations to another board. For example, a county may be looking for a new
planning director. Although the appointment power rests with the board of commission-
ers, the planning board may be asked to interview each candidate and make a recommen-
dation. In another example, although the Board of Governors of the University of
North Carolina system has legal power to make certain appointments and promotions,
the real point of decision is often with the full professors of the affected department.
Acceptance of the narrow meaning of "jurisdiction" would open up the meetings
potentially most embarrassing to persons.
66. Arthur v. Belk, 71 CVS 15686 (Mecklenburg County Super. Ct., Mar. 7,
1973).
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understood as an acceptance of the same burdens as the candidate for
election. The policy of the exception is simply not as strong for elected
officials and may well not extend to their appointments.
The same arguments would not extend to appointments or remov-
als by one board of members of another. The textual argument loses
force in this context. The appointing board may have created the
second board, may have established its duties, normally will control its
budget. The positions involved are back under the board's jurisdiction.
The policy considerations are different as well. With appointed boards
it is not unusual for a person's name to be submitted without his
knowledge or consent. We do not normally demand such windows into
the private lives of these people as we do with elected officials. 7
The Act leaves to the board the decision whether to open or close a
meeting on personnel matters. The committee substitute approved by
the house included a provision permitting an affected employee to
67. This question was litigated at the superior court level in Shinn v. Hair, 75 CVS
1962 (Mecklenburg County Super. Ct., June 23, 1975). The Mecklenburg County Board
of Commissioners had held closed meetings to appoint persons to the Anti-Discrimina-
tion Study Commission, the Community Energy Conservation Committee, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Insurance Advisory Committee and the County Board of Adjustment. Each
body had been established by action of the county commissioners, and the first three
drew their powers entirely from the establishing resolution. The Board of Adjustment
exercised statutory duties. The superior court distinguished between "officers," "employ-
ees" and "commissioners for a special purpose" and held that only the Board of
Adjustment members were officers; members of the other three boards were commission-
ers for a special purpose and therefore not within the terms of the exception. The
opinion can be challenged on its own terms. A commissioner for a special purpose is a
peculiar animal, found only in article XIV, section 7 of the 1868 constitution. That
section prohibited one person from simultaneously holding two public offices but
permitted a commissioner for a special purpose to also hold one public office. Except in
that context, which no longer exists, the commissioner for a special purpose was not and
is not a living part of our law. The Mecklenburg opinion assumes that the General
Assembly is in the habit of differentiating between officers and commissioners for a
special purpose, which is not so and, except in the dual-officeholding context, never has
been. Rather, the General Assembly frequently uses the phrase "officer or employee"
with the obvious intention of including anyone in a public position. For example, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159-28(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides that if "any officer or employee"
of a local government incurs an obligation or pays out money without following the pre-
audit procedures of that section, he is personally liable for the sums disbursed. It is
unreasonable to argue that section 159-28(e) does not apply to the members of the
Mecklenburg County Anti-Discrimination Study Commission, if they should have their
report printed without complying with section 159-28, because they are neither officers
nor employees but rather commissioners for a special purpose. More fundamentally,
however, the opinion asks the wrong questions. Whether a particular position is an
office, employment, or something else bears little relation to the likelihood that discus-
sions about the fitness of a holder or potential holder of the position may be embarrass-
ing to that person. An analysis of a problem under the personnel exception of the
statute should not lose sight of the purposes of the exception, assuming they were ever in
sight.
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demand a public hearing regarding any complaints against him,68 but
the provision was deleted by the senate committee. Thus the statute
provides the person who is the subject of a personnel discussion no
rights in deciding whether the meeting is open or closed. Even though
the exception protects primarily the employee's interest, the decision to
invoke it rests with the board, not the employee. If the employee is to
have a voice, his right must be constitutionally based.
Three cases have addressed the issue of whether a governmental
employee enjoys any constitutional right to an open hearing when he is
being disciplined or dismissed. In Fitzgerald v. Hampton,69 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's
injunction prohibiting the United States Civil Service Commission from
conducting a closed hearing into the reasons for plaintiff's separation
from his civilian employment with the Air Force. In Adams v. Mar-
shall"' the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts order requir-
ing a city civil service commission to hear in open session a police
officer's appeal of his disciplinary suspension. Both courts grounded
their decisions on the demands of due process. In both cases, the
employee enjoyed a legislated right to the hearing-by statute in Fitz-
gerald, by ordinance in Adams. Although both courts placed some
emphasis on this fact, due process often requires a hearing before
actions adverse to an individual employee may be taken, independent of
any statutory right, if the employee has a significant property interest in
his job (some "legitimate claim of entitlement") or if the charges
against him or the action taken might so damage his reputation or
ability to follow his profession that his constitutionally protected "liber-
ty" is threatened.71 Secondly, in both cases, the hearing body had a
final power of decision in the matter. These two cases suggest, then,
that if the employee has a right to a hearing-either statutory or
constitutional-and if the hearing body has power of decision in the
matter, due process requires that an employee's request for a public
hearing be granted.7
68. "[A]ny such employee or officer against whom a complaint is made... upon
his request, shall have the right to a public hearing with respect to any such complaint."
H. 51, 1971 N.C. General Assembly (version H2).
69. 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. 212 Kan. 595, 512 P.2d 365 (1973).
71. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
72. The courts have tended to distinguish between quasi-judicial hearings and
investigations, applying these due process protections only to the former. 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISmTAvE LAW § 8.09 (1958). If due process requires granting an employee's
request for a public session at a hearing, it would be overly simplistic to deny a similar
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
On the other side, however, stands Satterfield v. Board of Educa-
tion,7" in which the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff teacher was not
entitled to an open hearing before the school board concerning the
nonrenewal of his contract. Language in the opinion indicates that the
court did not think due process required a public hearing, but the
holding itself is narrower, resting on the specific circumstances of the
case. The teacher was black, and his nonrenewal had apparently
occasioned considerable unrest in the local black community. The
court noted evidence that an organized effort would be made to "over-
awe" the school board at the hearing and "coerce it" into renewing the
contract. In these special circumstances, the public interest in reasoned
decision-making countervailed whatever interest the teacher had in a
public hearing. 74 On its holding, Satterfield may perhaps be reconciled
with the other two cases. Its language indicates, however, that the basic
constitutional issue remains unsettled.
What if the employee wants the hearing closed, while the board
wishes it open? Although due process may require an open hearing if
the employee demands it, his interest is not the exclusive one. In re
Oliver,75 in which the Supreme Court required that state criminal trials
be public, provides the foundation for similar requirements in civil
actions. The Court justified the openness requirement as providing
protection against arbitrary governmental action. Although the individ-
ual's interest is most direct, society also has an interest in protecting
against governmental arbitrariness. While society's interest might not
demand that a personnel hearing be open if 'both employee and board
wish it closed, it may well justify a board's decision to keep the hearing
open despite contrary wishes of the employee.
H. Student Matters
The exception for student disciplinary hearings is part of the
paragraph containing the personnel exception and, as with that excep-
request during an investigation simply because it is an investigation. For example, many
city councils in North Carolina lack any formal power in employment decisions
regarding the police chief and police department. Yet an extensive investigation of the
police department, as recently occurred in High Point, may well involve extensive attacks
on the reputations of specific individuals and be the ground for later disciplinary actions
by the proper official. The investigation, that is, might so involve the "liberty" of an
individual as to invoke due process protections.
73. Civil No. 75-1191 (4th Cir., Dec. 5, 1975).
74. Id.
75. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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tion, is phrased as a savings clause.76 However, no North Carolina
statute permits pupil or student disciplinary hearings to be closed. If
the language is to be given any effect, it must be understood as a full
exception rather than as a savings clause. The policy of the exception
seems also to parallel that of the personnel exception-to protect indi-
vidual reputations. Finally, statutory control over the exception rests
with the board, not the pupil or student.77
Analysis of whether there exists a constitutional right of the student
or pupil to demand a public hearing begins with Goss v. Lopez.78  In
that case the United States Supreme Court extended due process protec-
tion to pupils subjected to even one day suspensions. The Court
required notice to the pupil and a hearing giving a right to reply to the
charges. However, both notice and hearing may be very informal,
taking place at the scene of the alleged misbehavior. The Court saw no
need for more elaborate procedural protections, such as counsel or the
right of confrontation.7" The implication is strong that in that situation
due process does not demand a public hearing.
Of course, the North Carolina open-meetings law applies only to
meetings of boards; a hearing before an individual administrator does
not fall within its terms. A board would enter a school discipline case
only at an "appellate" level. For short suspensions, it seems unlikely
that the board would be subject to more stringent due process require-
ments than the initial administrator; there would be no constitutional
requirement to open the hearing at the pupil's request.
With long suspensions or expulsions, the situation is less clear. The
Goss Court suggested that more formal procedural requirements would
apply to long suspensions or expulsions. Several courts prior to Goss
had addressed the question of open hearings and decided against any
such right for the pupil. Each court recognized that due process was
demanded, but each suggested that the full protection of a criminal trial
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(b) (1974).
77. The bill, when it left the house, permitted the pupil or student to demand a
public hearing. The house committee substitute contained the following provision:
"provided, however, that any such student shall have a right to be present and a right to
be represented by counsel at any such session." H. 51, 1971 N.C. General Assembly
(version H2). During floor debate, an amendment added "and upon his request, shall
have the right to a public hearing." H. 51, 1971 N.C. General Assembly (version 113).
Both the initial provision and the amendment were deleted by the Senate committee. H.
51, 1971 N.C. General Assembly (version H5).
78. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
79. Id. at 583.
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was unnecessary.80 The hesitancy the Goss Court exhibited about
extending due process claims too far in school matters may indicate that
the earlier cases remain good law."'
I. Emergency Conditions
The final subject-matter exception, which extends only to local
governments, seems straightforward enough: local boards may meet in
closed session to deal with emergencies.8 2
IRI. EXCLUDED AGENcIEs
A. Introduction
The Act entirely excludes several named agencies and categories
of agencies from the statute. Four agencies are specifically ex-
cluded: The Council of State, the Board of Awards, the Board of
Paroles, and the Probation Commission.83 Each has traditionally con-
ducted business in closed session, and the General Assembly was per-
suaded to allow them to continue to do so. Two other exceptions are
straightforward: all petit and grand juries and all occupational licens-
ing boards. The four remaining exceptions deserve more detailed
comment.
80. Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972) (suspension of
secondary school pupil); Pierce v. School Comm., 322 F. Supp. 957 (D. Mass. 1971)
(expulsion of secondary school pupil); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State
Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (suspension of university student); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) (expulsion of university
student).
81. The Court divided 5-4. 419 U.S. at 566.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(c) (1974).
83. Id. § 143-318.4. This listing is from the statute as enacted in 1971. Pursuant
to a 1970 amendment to the state constitution (N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11), the General
Assembly has been reorganizing state government for the last half-decade, grouping
several hundred state agencies into a few departments. Consequently, both the Parole
Board and the Probation Commission are now part of the Department of Correction.
Reorganization has been accompanied by a formal transfer of the legal powers of each
formerly separate agency to the new department of which it is a part. Therefore, as part
of the reorganization of the Department of Correction, all statutory references to the
State Probation Commission and most statutory references to the Parole Board were
changed to "Department of Correction." Law of April 11, 1974, ch. 1262, § 10(a) (2),
[1973] N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 376. For that reason, section 143-318.4 now lists the
Department of Correction as an excluded agency twice, despite the continuation of the
Parole Board as the Parole Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-266 to -267. (Cum.
Supp. 1976). (An example of the indiscriminate manner in which these statutory
references were changed is found in section 15-206, where the Secretary of Corrections is
now directed to cooperate with the Department of Correction, in order to coordinate
probation and parole.) In this context it seems unlikely that the broadened language of
section 143-318.4 was intended to broaden the exception as well.
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B. Law Enforcement Agencies
This exception purposes to maintain the secrecy of law enforce-
ment investigations.84 Opening to the public a meeting of law enforce-
ment officers discussing leads in a particular case might not only alert
suspects but also damage the reputation of persons temporarily under
suspicion. The principal question regarding the exception is the defini-
tion of a law enforcement agency. Certainly such agencies include a
city police department, a sheriff's department, and the Highway Patrol.
But many public employees enforce laws. For example, building in-
spectors and sanitarians enforce laws carrying misdemeanor penalties;8 5
however, the departments these employees represent are not normally
considered law enforcement agencies, and probably the General Assem-
bly did not so consider them either.
The distinction between the inspector and the policeman suggested
here is the power of arrest. At a minimum the officers of an agency
should be vested with the power of arrest for that agency to be consid-
ered a law enforcement agency. This standard finds support in other
statutes dealing with law enforcement officers. Chapter 17A of the
General Statutes establishes a Criminal Justice Training and Standards
Council, empowered to establish minimum standards for criminal justice
officers, who include both law enforcement officers and correctional
officers."6  Administratively, the Council has defined law enforce-
ment officers as officers vested with the power of arrest.87  The Gen-
eral Assembly itself has defined law enforcement officers, for pur-
poses of the Law-Enforcement Officers Benefit and Retirement Fund,
as officers "clothed with the full power of arrest."88 The standard also
makes sense practically. An inspection department or health depart-
ment is unlikely to be making the kinds of investigations that justify the
exception; secrecy is simply not necessary to their operations.
84. As introduced, IL 51 excepted "meetings of the personnel of the State Bureau
of Investigation or of any other law enforcement or investigatory body where investiga-
tions are to be discussed." This formulation was not in the house committee substitute,
which contains substantially the final language.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.33 (1974); id. § 160A-423 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
86. Id. § 17A-2 (1975).
87. Letter to author from James F. Hoynig, Associate Director of the Council,
Criminal Justice Training and Standards, Raleigh, N.C., Mar. 1, 1974.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-166(m) (1974). The definition goes on to require also
that law enforcement officers have as their "primary duty . . . enforcing on public
property the criminal laws of the State and/or serving civil processes." The apparent
intention of this additional qualification is to except company police, deputized pursuant
to id. §§ 74A-1 to -6 (1975), from the retirement system.
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In most cases, if an agency's officers have the power of arrest, that
will be sufficient to include the agency within the exception. In a few
instances, however, the power of arrest is obviously incidental to other
duties. State park rangers are appointed as special peace officers with
the power of arrest in order to enforce park regulations,89 but this takes
only a very small portion of their time. In some cities, firemen are
authorized to make arrests of persons obstructing fire-fighting activi-
ties. 90 In such a situation, in which the arrest power is obviously
incidental to the officer's principal responsibilities, the employing agen-
cy should not be considered a law enforcement agency.
One other question arises. The exception, by its language, extends
to "all law-enforcement agencies." Does it thereby extend to all activi-
ties of a law enforcement agency? For example, law enforcement
officers, as understood here, include state and local Alcoholic Beverage
Control (ABC) enforcement officers and wildlife protectors. Does the
exception therefore also include the state and local ABC boards and the
Wildlife Resources Commission? The policy of the exception indi-
cates at most a partial inclusion within it of these boards. Most of
their work has nothing to do with law enforcement in specific cases, and
therefore the presumed purpose of the exception is not engaged. How-
ever, there may be occasions when particular cases are discussed with
the board, and these discussions should be within the exception.
C. Study, Research and Investigative Bodies
The exception provided by section 143-318.4(7) of the General
Statutes is really two exceptions. The words "including the Legislative
Services Commission" were added by a senate floor amendment, and the
location probably seemed convenient. Generally, the Services Commis-
sion is charged with providing and supervising support activities for the
General Assembly,91 and none of its duties can easily be characterized
as involving study, research, or investigation. Rather, it has had occa-
sion to meet in closed session in the past, and presumably the amend-
ment was simply to permit that practice to continue.
The other exception is, of course, for "study, research and investi-
gative commissions and committees." Clearly, the exception includes
all agencies whose sole purpose is either study, research, or investiga-
89. Id. § 113-28.2 (1975)..
90. E.g., CrARLOTIE CrrY CHARTmR, ch. 713, § 6.82, [1965] N.C. Sess. Laws 958.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-32 (1974).
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tion, such as the state study commissions frequently created to function
between general assemblies, or an administrative committee within a
local government studying whether and how to place greater financial
reliance on user charges. The principal question raised is whether the
exception also extends to groups normally subject to the law while they
are engaged in study, research, or investigatory tasks. For example,
does it include a city council while conducting an investigation of the
police department, a planning commission while studying the downtown
area preparatory to developing a central business district plan? If one
looks to the apparent policies behind the exception, strong arguments
emerge for including the council and planning commission within the
exception.
Those policies are clearest with regard to investigative efforts.
Frequently an investigation will be concerned with charges that if true
would severely impair the reputations of persons being investigated.
Unfortunately, once broadcast, even groundless charges could damage a
reputation. To avoid such needless damage, investigations often are
conducted in private. In addition, witnesses will sometimes be afraid to
come forward if an investigation is conducted publicly. Finally, an
investigation conducted secretly is less likely to alert those being investi-
gated, a consideration sometimes of some importance. Probably these
kinds of considerations led to the exception for investigative groups. The
policies regarding study and research are less plain, but probably in-
volved a sense that these activities simply were inappropriate for a
continuing requirement of openness. Then, too, the line between study
and investigation is not sharp, and some of the considerations pertinent
to the latter may have been seen to spill over to the former as well.
These policies are as applicable to a city council's investigation as
to that of a legislative committee created specifically for investigation.
An investigation by a council could damage reputations as easily as
could one by a group whose sole purpose was investigation. This
argument is met, however, by the language of the exception itself, which
in its most natural reading includes only groups whose purpose is study,
research, or investigation and no more. And here the language may
suggest another aspect of the policy. A group whose sole purpose is
study, research, or investigation typically has no power of decision.
Rather, it uses its findings to make recommendations to another group,
and it may normally 'be expected to document, or at least defend, its
recommendations. During that process many of its proceedings will
enter the public domain. The city council investigating the police
1976]
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department, however, is a decisionmaker as well; it may implement its
own recommendations, without need of defending them before another
body. Thus the underlying findings may never come to public atten-
tion. Given that difference from the actual investigating commission, a
limitation of the exception to the single-purpose group makes sense.
D. Quasi-Judicial Agencies
All "State agencies, commissions or boards exercising quasi-judi-
cial functions" are excepted "during any meeting or session held solely
for the purpose of making a decision in an adjudicatory action or
proceeding.'92 The exception is consistent with that for fully judicial
agencies--the grand and petit juries and the appellate courts.
"Quasi-judicial" is not defined, but the term has been glossed by the
supreme court. Former chapter 143, article 33 (Judicial Review of
Decisions of Certain Administrative Agencies) of the North Carolina
General Statutes,93 applied to "administrative decisions" as defined by
section 143-306(2): "any decision, order, or determination rendered
by an administrative agency in a proceeding in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitution-
al right to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing." In
Duke v. State ex rel. Shaw94 the court characterized former article 33 as
contemplating a "quasi-judicial hearing in which the parties were per-
mitted an opportunity to offer evidence and a decision rendered applica-
ble to a specific factual situation." '  In In re Markham90 the court
noted that a local board of adjustment exercises quasi-judicial power, "it
being its duty to investigate facts and from its investigation to draw
conclusions as a basis of official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. '9 7  Thus, a quasi-judicial proceeding might be char-
acterized as one involving specific parties, one or more hearings at
which evidence is taken, legal conclusions drawn from the evidence, and
legal determinations made that are binding on the parties.
Numerous boards, commissions, and agencies of state government
exercise quasi-judicial powers. A lengthy and careful effort would be
91. Id. § 143-3.18.4(8).
93. This article has been replaced by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure
Act, N.C. GEN. SrAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
94. 247 N.C. 236, 100 S.E.2d 506 (1957).
95. Id. at 239, 100 S.E.2d at 508.
96. 259N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329 (1963).
97. Id. at 572, 131 S.E.2d at 334, quoting Harden v. City of Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395,
397, 135 S.E. 151, 152 (1926).
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necessary to compile a complete listing, but examples would include the
state ABC Board, the state Property Tax Commission, the state Board
of Elections, the Banking Commission, and the Industrial Commis-
sion.0 8
The difficult problem raised by this exception is whether it extends
to quasi-judicial agencies of local government. Zoning boards of adjust-
ment, in granting variances from or special exceptions to the zoning
ordinance, exercise quasi-judicial powers. County boards of equaliza-
tion and review, in hearing appeals from the tax supervisor, exercise
quasi-judicial powers. Local election boards, in hearing registration
challenges and investigating election law violations, exercise quasi-judi-
cial powers. So, in some circumstances, do county boards of social
services, local boards of education, civil service boards, and probably
other agencies as well.
The same policies that justify excepting state level quasi-judicial
proceedings apply to local proceedings. 'Once the hearing is completed
and the evidence taken, the hearing agency must be able to consider and
discuss the evidence freely. If a witness is not believed, it is much easier
to say so, and why, when the witness or his attorney is not listening in
the audience. Judicial fact-finders are not required to meet in public or
explain their interpretation and weighing of the evidence; quasi-judicial
fact-finders, whether acting at the state or local level, undertake the
same sort of tasks as judicial fact-finders. The policy of the exception
argues for including local agencies.
The principal argument against extending the exception to local
quasi-judicial agencies arises from the exception's language: it speaks
of "State agencies, commissions or boards exercising quasi-judicial func-
tions."'99 It is not difficult to find and cite cases in which courts have
characterized agencies of local government as "state agencies." After
all, local government in North Carolina exists only by action of the
General Assembly and is essentially a convenient means of exercising
the basic governmental powers that rest with the state. Thus under-
stood, all local government agencies are state agencies. This is the
theory by which actions of cities or counties can be characterized as
"state actions" under the fourteenth amendment.10  But the open-
meetings statute clearly applies to both state and local government, and
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18A-15(12), 105-290, 113-22, 143-291 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(8) (1974) (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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so the casting of this one exception in terms of "state" agencies is most
naturally read as an extension of the exception to state agencies only, as
distinguished from local agencies.
If we must accept that the language of the quasi-judicial exception
will simply not stretch to include all quasi-judicial agencies otherwise
subject to the open-meetings law, we still must consider the essential
characteristics of a state agency exercising quasi-judicial powers, as
opposed to a local agency. The policy considerations outlined above
justify an expansive understanding of "state." Three possible tests
follow by which the line between state and local might be drawn. They
are not entirely serial, and some agencies that might be included under
the first test would not be included under the second. Therefore, the
three tests should not be considered mutually exclusive; perhaps an
agency that meets any one test should be considered a state agency. 10 1
1. State supervision. An agency subject to extensive direction
and control by a state government department might be considered a
state agency for purposes of the exception. Although such an agency
might be locally appointed and in part locally funded, it is to a signifi-
cant degree simply an administrative arm of the state department.
Examples of such agencies, each of which sometimes exercise quasi-
judicial functions, would include local boards of election, local boards of
social services, and local school boards.
2. Statutory duties. A second test would extend the exception to
agencies whose duties are set by statute, as distinguished from those
whose duties are set by local ordinance or resolution. So read, the
exception would include some of the agencies included under the first
test and also an agency such as a county board of equalization and
review.
3. Statutory creation. The broadest test would extend the ex-
ception to any agency created or required by statute, that is, by the
General Assembly. Agencies created by ordinance-such as local
personnel appeals boards or human relations commissions- would still
be excluded.
101. The suggested lines are difficult to defend in the context of the exception itself.
That is, it is not clear why an agency should be included within the exception simply
because it is subject to extensive state government direction, or because its duties are set
by state statute. The difficulty, however, rests with the basic statutory distinction. What
is there about the work of a state quasi-judicial agency, as opposed to a local agency, that




The final exception of the section asserts the right of any legislative
committee or subcommittee to meet in closed session but requires that
final action be taken in open session.102 The exception was added by a
senate floor amendment, and the language tracks the senate rules then in
force.10 3  In 1973 the house adopted a rule requiring its committees and
subcommittees always to permit attendance by the public, 10 4 imposing
on itself a more rigorous standard than does the Act. 0 5 Either house
could probably also adopt a rule subjecting itself to a standard less
rigorous than the statute, perhaps by expanding the justification for a
closed meeting or permitting final action to be taken in closed session.
Each house of the General Assembly bears responsibility for its own
rules, and it is generally agreed that one General Assembly may not
bind a successor, particularly in an internal matter such as rules.'06
Although it is not usual, rules might certainly be adopted by statute.
However, a rule adopted by statute ought not to be accorded any greater
dignity than other rules; it should be repealable by simple action of
either house. Otherwise, simply by adopting rules by statute, one
General Assembly could bind its successors unless both houses were
willing to change the rule. Thus it would seem that the Act binds each
house of the General Assembly only so long as that house's rules do not
provide otherwise.
IV. STATE BUDGET PREPARATION AND APPROVAL
The Act makes special provision for several agencies involved in
the state budget process: the Advisory Budget Commission and the
various appropriations committees of the General Assembly. 0 7  The
Advisory Budget Commission, consisting of several legislators and gub-
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(10) (1974).
103. Rule 36 provided, in part, that "[a]ny committee has the inherent right to hold
an executive session when it determines that it is absolutely necessary to have such a
session in order to prevent personal embarrassment, or when it is in the best interest of
the State; and in no event shall final action be taken by any committee or subcommittee
except in open session." SENATE RULEs DRoRY, 11969] N.C. General Assembly 22.
104. Rule 29(b) provides: "Subject to the provisions of the subsection (c) of this
Rule [which permits the chairman to bar persons from a committee's meeting in order to
maintain order], standing committees and subcommittees thereof shall permit other
members of the General Assembly, the press, and the general public to attend all sessions
of said committees and subcommittees." HL JouR., t1973] N.C. General Assembly 1056.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(10) (1974).
106. See State v. Norman, 237 N.C. 205, 74 S.E.2d 602 (1953); 73 Am. Jun. 2d
Statutes § 49 (1974).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.5 (1974).
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ernatorial appointees, works with the Governor and his budget director
in preparing a proposed state budget for each General Assembly. The
appropriations committees are, of course, the legislative committees that
receive that proposed budget.'08
1. Advisory Budget Commission. The provisions with regard to
the Commission are plain. Its work is divisible into two segments.
First, it holds a series of public hearings on budget requests from state
departments and agencies. Second, it holds a series of meetings to
review those requests and shape the proposed budget. Section 143-10
of the General Statutes requires the first, public hearing segment, and
the second part of section 143-318.5(a) is intended to keep those
hearings public. It is the second segment of the Commission's work
that accounts for its specific mention in the open-meetings act. Com-
mission meetings held for "actually preparing the [state] budget" are
expressly excepted from the Act.
2. Appropriations Committees. The work of the appropriations
committees of the General Assembly might also be divided into two
segments, a public hearing segment and a series of meetings to shape the
budget for presentation to each house. Paralleling the Advisory Budget
Commission, the second segment has traditionally been carried on in
closed session.
The open-meetings act takes note of the legislature's budgetary
process in section 143-318.5(b), which, in typical savings-clause lan-
guage, provides that nothing in the open-meetings act is to have any
effect on section 143-14. The latter provides, in appropriate part, as
follows: "The appropriations committees . . . and subcommittees
thereof shall sit jointly0 9 in open sessions while considering the budget
... . To these sessions of the joint committee or subcommittees shall
be admitted, with the right to be heard, all taxpayers or other persons
interested in the estimates under consideration." 110  It can be argued
108. For many years, and until 1975, the General Assembly used a single (joint)
appropriations committee, with one or more joint subcommittees, in reviewing the
Governor's proposed budget. In 1975, however, the house established two committees
for the review process: the Appropriations Committee, which reviewed requests for new
programs, and the Base Budget Committee, which considered whether existing programs
should be continued. Because the senate retained a single appropriations committee, the
practice of a joint committee could not be maintained and the two houses proceeded
independently.
109. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 143-14 (1974) recognizes that its directions are in the
character of a rule of each house, and as such, may be changed by rule of either house.
Thus, no amendment of the statute was necessary when joint hearings became impossible
with the 1975 reorganization of the house committee system.
110. Id. § 143-14.
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that this section is intended to apply only to the public hearing stage of
the committee's work since the public "right to be heard" would be
inappropriate once the hearing stage was completed. However, the
General Assembly has indicated at least twice'" that it understands the
public's right to be present to extend to all the committee's work.
Therefore, the construction issue is simply noted.
The open-meetings act, then, expressly provides that it is to have
no effect on the mandate of section 143-14 that the appropriations
committees and subcommittees carry out their work in public. In the
absence of the savings clause, the Act seemingly would abrogate section
143-14, for, as noted, section 143-318.4 emphatically affirms the "in-
herent right" of any committee or subcommittee of the General Assem-
bly to hold an executive session when it determines such a session to be
necessary. The obvious effect of section 143-318.5(c), it would seem,
is to prevent such an abrogation."2 The Attorney General reached just
this conclusion in 1973, advising the chairmen of the appropriations
committees that executive sessions of either the joint committee or any
subcommittees would violate the open-meetings act.".3 A joint sub-
committee had begun the final shaping of the budget in the traditional
secrecy, and the news media had objected."14  This occasioned the
inquiry to the Attorney General, and his advice was thereafter followed.
If some future General Assembly should wish to permit the appro-
priations committees once more to meet behind closed doors, it need not
amend the open-meetings act; it could simply change its rules. The last
sentence of section 143-14 provides: "In so far as this section prescribes
the method and manner of hearings before [the appropriations] com-
mittees this section shall be considered and have the force of a rule of
each branch of the General Assembly while and unless a change has
been made by an express rule of such branch thereof." T"his sentence
is probably declaratory of the law, as one General Assembly should not
be able to adopt rules binding on its successors simply by adopting them
in statutory form. 1 5 Such an interpretation was apparently accepted by
111. In 1955 and 1973. See text accompanying notes 116-19 infra.
112. That purpose, clear on the face of the statute, does not accord with the
legislative history. The savings clause is in the senate committee substitute, inserted by
the senate committee. The "inherent right" exception was inserted later, as a senate
floor amendment. It is not usual to apply the cure before the sickness strikes. See note
8 supra.
113. Letter from Attorney General Robert Morgan to Carl J. Stewart, Jr., Chin. of
House Approp. Comm., April 30, 1973.
114. See Raleigh News & Observer, Apr. 25, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
115. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
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the 1955 General Assembly, which did modify the statute by rule. The
1953 session had been marked by embarassing publicity of secret meet-
ings by the appropriations subcommittee. Despite the language of
section 143-14, subcommittee deliberations had, by 1953, enjoyed a
long history of secrecy. However, the 1953 subcommittee began its
deliberations with a declared policy of openness-a policy it was ready
to surrender within a week. But that year the reporters refused to leave,
pointing to, among other arguments, the requirements of section 143-
14. In a classic steamroller, a bill permitting closed sessions of the
committee or any subcommittee was introduced and enacted in one
day." 6  That ended the matter in 1953. The first day of the 1955
session, however, saw introduction of a repeal of the 1953 amendment,
and the matter again was discussed in the press. Eventually the 1953
amendment was repealed,"17 but not before each house adopted a rule
that permitted any committee to meet in executive session."18 It was
only after the 1973 house amended its rules to require open meetings of
all committees"'9 that the stage was set for the Attorney General's
opinion mentioned above.
116. The Act added the following proviso to the end of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-14
(1974):
Provided, after public or open hearings have been held and opportunity
has been afforded all persons interested in any appropriation to be heard
thereon, the joint committee or any subcommittee thereof, within the discretion
of the committee or subcommittee, may hold Sessions at which only members
of the committee or subcommittee and those designated by the committee or
subcommittee may attend, for discussion and consideration of any and all mat-
ters referred to the committee or subcommittee, but final action by the joint
committee shall not be taken with respect to any appropriation except in open
meetings of the joint committee.
Law of March 27, 1953, ch. 501, [1953] N.C. Sess. Laws 374.
The events leading up to passage of chapter 501 are reported in the Raleigh News
and Observer, Mar. 18, 1953, at 1, col. 6; Mar. 25, 1953, at 1, col. 1; Mar. 26, 1953, at 1,
col. 8.' The News and Observer reported that on the afternoon of March 25, the
subcommittee sought to avoid the press by renting and meeting in a small dining room at
the Carolina Hotel. Several reporters were tipped off, however, and were waiting for the
members at the hotel. Therefore, the paper reported, the committee locked the dining
room door and went in through the hotel kitchen. Id., Mar. 26, 1953, at 1, col. 8.
117. Act of Jan. 28, 1955, ch. 5, [1955] N.C. Sess. Laws 4.
118. The house acted first, adopting a new rule that provided in appropriate part:
"Provided furtber, that upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the members of any
standing committee or sub-committee executive sessions may be held, but in no event
shall final action be taken in executive sessions." H. Jou., [1955] N.C. General
Assembly 50. The senate responded to the house action with a rule that assumed
committees could meet in closed session as they wished: "Notwithstanding [sic] the
inherent right of any committee or sub-committee to hold Executive Sessions, no
committee or sub-committee shall take any final action on any measure or thing before it
except in open Session." S. Jou., [1955 N.C. General Assembly 51.
119. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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V. MINUTES OF ExEcuTIvE SESSIONS
The minutes of a governmental board are the official evidence of
its actions. For many boards, the statutes require that minutes be
kept;2 0 for all boards, minutes are necessary to prove that actions have
been properly authorized or taken. Minutes of a governmental board
are public records, available to the public under North Carolina's public
record statute.121 Against this background, two questions arise. First,
must minutes be kept of executive sessions? And secondly, if so, are
those minutes then to be open to the public?
In many instances, no problem need arise. Although no statute
defines the degree of detail necessary in a board's minutes, the General
Assembly has provided substantial direction to governmental boards in
this matter through its own example. The journals of each house
constitute the minutes of the General Assembly. Those journals do not
record debate; unless specific request is made, they do not record
statements by members. Rather, they simply record each action taken
and no more. The fundamental reason for minutes or journals is to
prove what action has been taken by a board or assembly and by what
procedural steps. The legislative journals answer that need. Certainly,
what suffices for the General Assembly ought to suffice for the govern-
mental boards of state and local government. All that minutes need do
is record actions; a discussion alone, no matter how extended, need not
be reflected in the minutes.
Many-probably most-executive sessions consist only of dis-
cussion. At most, the minutes need show only that an executive ses-
sion was held, perhaps stating the general topic-acquisition of prop-
erty, a personnel matter, etc. No difficulty should arise in making
such minutes public immediately. With those executive sessions in
which an action is taken, it may be the discussion that occasions the
secrecy, rather than the resulting action. For example, a city council
might meet in private to discuss the three final candidates for the posi-
tion of city manager, concluding with a decision to hire one of the three.
If the minutes simply recorded the decision, again no difficulty should
arise from making the minutes public immediately.
Unfortunately, the problem cannot always be avoided. Some exec-
utive sessions will result in a decision that should, at least for a time, be
kept private. To return to an earlier example, a session to consider the
acquisition of property may result in a specific action: a direction to
120. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-42 (1974).
121. Id. § 132-1.
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the board's negotiator. If those directions become public information
before negotiations are concluded, the entire purpose of the executive
session has been frustrated.
Yet how is publicity to be avoided? Practical need or statutory
direction requires that minutes be kept; the public-records statute then
makes them public information. It is not a sensible answer to admit
this result makes little sense but cannot be escaped. A better answer is
to suggest that the open-meetings law, with its permission to hold
executive sessions, has the effect of amending-to a minor degree-the
public-records statute. The open-meetings law recognizes that confi-
dentiality in public business is sometimes justified. For as long as the
justification continues, that confidentiality ought not to be lost by the
action of another statute. Once the justification is lost, of course, no
need for confidentiality continues. Thus, in the example, once negotia-
tion had concluded, the minutes of the executive session should become
public record. The public-records statute embodies a policy of absolute
openness, but one that dates from 1935. The open-meetings law-a
much more recent statute---embodies a more complex policy. To the
extent that reconciliation between the two policies is necessary, the more
recent has stronger claim to prevail.
VI. REM EIsS
A. Injunctive Relief
The Act permits any "citizen denied access to a meeting required
to be open!' to seek appropriate relief in order to compel compliance
with the Act.12 2  This provision has been the basis for several suits
brought by reporters or their employers 23 against boards that barred the
reporter from a meeting. When the court has found for plaintiffs in
such suits, there has been an unfortunate tendency to enter a judgment
enjoining the defendant board and its members from violating any
122. Id. § 143-318.6.
123. The statute permits suits by citizens denied access, and "citizen" normally
connotes a natural, as opposed to artificial, person. Therefore, the reporter, rather than
the employee, should be the party plaintiff. In Eggimann v. Wake County Bd. of Educ.,
22 N.C. App. 459, 206 S.E.2d 754 (1974), the court of appeals suggested that the
requirement that the plaintiff have been actually denied access makes inappropriate a
class action seeking equitable relief under North Carolina General Statutes section 143-
318.6. Id. at 462, 206 S.E.2d at 757. It is individuals who are turned away from
council doors, not classes. However, if the notion of denial of access is to include lack
of reasonable notice of a meeting, see text accompanying note 27 supra, then a class
action alleging denial of access of that sort would seem appropriate.
816 [Vol. 54
N.C. OPEN-MEETINGS LAW
provision of the open-meetings law.124  This language of the statute is
ambiguous, and it is clear that legitimate divisions of opinion are possi-
ble, perhaps even likely, over many of its provisions. A board under a
flat injunction not to violate the statute is likely to be very careful in any
gray area of the statute, preferring to meet in public rather than run the
risk of being held in contempt. As a result, some of the policy consider-
ations recognized by the inclusion of the exceptions in the statute might
be vitiated. 12 5 More appropriate injunctive relief would be to forbid the
specific conduct that led to the lawsuit. For example, if a board met in
closed session to consider filling a vacancy in its own ranks and this was
held to be a violation of the statute, 20 the appropriate injunctive relief
(if anything more than declaratory relief were thought necessary) would
be to prohibit closed meetings to consider that particular subject. Such
an order presumes the general good intentions of the board toward the
statute, and it is only when that presumption is challenged-such as, by
a series of invalidly closed meetings-that a blanket injunction would be
proper.
Although injunctive relief is the only remedy explicitly provided
by the statute, the remedies section states that it is "in addition to other
remedies." In addition, the section empowers a plaintiff to seek a
restraining order, an injunction, "or other appropriate :relief." The
statute itself, then, invites speculation about other remedies, and the
discussion below focuses on two: criminal sanctions and voiding actions
taken at improperly closed meetings.
B. Criminal Sanctions
Two old statutes make criminal the failure of public officials to
discharge their official duties. Section 14-230 of the General Statutes
provides that if a public officer "shall willfully omit, neglect or refuse to
discharge any of the duties of his office," he has committed a misde-
meanor. Section 14-231 provides that if a state or county officer "shall
fail, neglect or refuse. . . to discharge any duty devolving upon him by
virtue of his office," he has committed a misdemeanor. The chief
124. For example, in Arthur v. Belk, 71 CVS 15685 (Mecklenburg County Super.
Ct., Mar. 7, 1973), the court enjoined the Charlotte City Council from holding closed
meetings except for the subjects excepted by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3 (1974).
125. In Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 215
N.W.2d 814 (1974), the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that a general prohibition
against violating the Minndota open-meetings statute might be too broad, on the sorts of.
considerations sketched here.
126. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
19761 817
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
differences between the two sections seem to be, first, that section 14-
230 requires a willful failure to discharge duties while section 14-231
does not; and secondly, section 14-230 applies to all public officers
while section 14-231 applies only to state and county officers.
These two statutes may cover violations of the open-meetings
statute. It is not clear that they do, because it is not clear that the open-
meetings law creates any "duties." Certainly it creates no direct duties
of the character of a duty to erect and repair county buildings, 127 to
appoint a recorder, 128 to return process, 29 or even to enforce the
laws,'30 each of which has been the actual or mooted subject of a
prosecution under one or the other of these two statutes. Rather, the
open-meetings law sets out procedural requirements, that is, require-
ments of openness, that must be followed when boards meet to carry out
their substantive duties. At most, one might construct from the laws a
duty to meet in open session except when the law permits a closed
meeting-not a very specific duty.
Given the reasonable differences of opinion as to what is actually
demanded or permitted by the open-meetings law, criminal sanctions in
all but the most egregious and sustained violations would seem inappro-
priate. As a practical matter, they are very unlikely to be invoked.
C. Voidability
In Lewis v. White'"' the plaintiffs sought to keep the state's art
museum in downtown Raleigh, despite a decision by the Art Museum
Building Commission to build it on the city's outskirts. Among the
several arguments made by the plaintiffs was that the Commission had
systematically held all its meetings in closed session in violation of the
open-meetings statute, and that therefore all decisions emerging from
those meetings, including the location decision, were void. Because the
statute was silent on this point, the supreme court declined to hold with
plaintiffs.' 3 2
It is important to understand just what this part of Lewis v. White
held. The plaintiffs argued that any action emanating from a meeting
held in violation of the statute was automatically void. This argument
127. State v. Leeper, 146 N.C. 655, 61 S.B. 585 (1908).
128. State ex rel. Battle v. City of Rocky Mount, 156 N.C. 329, 72 S.E. 354 (1911).
129. State v. Berry, 169 N.C. 371, 85 S.E. 387 (1915).
130. State v. Hord, 264 N.C. 149, 141 S.E.2d 241 (1965).
131. 287 N.C. 625, 216 S.E.2d 134 (1975).
132. Id. at 632, 216 S.E.2d at 139.
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the court declined to accept.'3 3 Not raised, and therefore not decided,
was whether voiding such an action would be a permissible remedy in a
proper case-that is, whether actions taken at a closed meeting, though
not void, might still be voidable.
The statute's silence as to the voidability of actions is not necessari-
ly fatal to such a remedy. Courts often require compliance with proce-
dural requirements--and the open-meetings law is essentially a proce-
dural requirement-as a condition of the legality of substantive actions.
If the procedural requirement is not met, the action is voided. Bagwell
v. Town of Brevard'3 4 offers a North Carolina example of this practice.
In the summer of 1965 the town of Brevard decided to dispose of some
real property pursuant to section 160-59 of the General Statutes, which
required thirty days published notice before the sale.'3" The town
began advertising on July 22 for an August 21 sale. A few days later,
however, it was discovered that the original advertisement had contained
an error, so a new one was prepared and first published on July 29. The
sale was still held on August 21. Plaintiff was successful bidder on the
twenty-first, and on August 23 the town council directed its attorney to
close the sale. Another bidder then appeared, however, prepared to pay
several thousand dollars more than plaintiff, and the town accepted this
new offer. In this action for specific performance of the contract of sale
between plaintiff and the town, the court held that the thirty-day notice
required by the statute had not been given, and therefore the August 21
sale and subsequent contract with plaintiff were void.13" No statute
expressly authorized this remedy.
If actions are to be voidable, in what kinds of situations should this
remedy be used? The most obvious situation would be one in which the
violation of the open-meetings statute seems to have had a demonstrable
effect on the substantive action taken. The recent case of Sullivan v.
Credit River TownSlhip137 illustrates the kind of situation in which void-
ing an action seems most appropriate. In May and June 1971, the
plaintiff met three times with the governing board of the defendant
township to discuss a prospective landfill site. Each meeting was
held without public notice. At the third meeting, the board approved
the site and entered a contract with the plaintiff, who was to develop
133. Id.
134. 267 N.C. 604, 148 S.E.2d 635 (1966).
13,5. Act of June 10, 1959, ch. 862, [1959] N.C. Sess. Laws 876.
136. 267 N.C. at 608, 148 S.E.2d at 638.
137. 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502 (1974).
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and operate the landfill. Landfills are not popular with neighbors,
and, when the neighbors of this one discovered what had happened,
they demanded that the contract be rescinded. In December the
board held a well-publicized and well-attended hearing on the matter
and, as a result, did rescind the contract. It seems clear that had the
earlier meetings been held in public, the contract would never have
been executed.138 Anyone who has ever attended a large public hearing
with an excited crowd in attendance knows the force that such a public
can have on the decisionmakers. When a board meets in illegal closed
session, in an attempt to avoid that kind of public pressure, its actions
present the strongest case for voidability.
Beyond this simple sort of factual situation, voidability becomes
much more complex. The suitability of such a remedy will depend on a
number of factors, and their weight would have to be developed case by
case. A further look at the Sullivan case demonstrates one sort of
complicating factor, a very important one, for in the actual case the court
refused to void the contract between plaintiff and the township. Once
the contract was signed, plaintiff bought the site and commenced to
prepare it for landfill operations, spending about $10,000 in the process.
He had developed a reliance interest of sorts in the contract, and to void
it would have imposed an unfair burden on him because of the board's
illegal action.1 9 Once persons have begun to act in reliance on a
challenged action, the arguments for voiding that action, particularly in
the face of the statute's silence, become weaker. Thus the remedy of
voidability is most suitable in an action begun quite soon after the
meeting involved.
CONCLUSION
Although sometimes unartfully drawn, the provisions of the open-
meetings law are clearly suggestive of the purposes they seek to serve.
This article has attempted to demonstrate a method of statutory inter-
pretation that consistently seeks statutory meaning in the context of
these purposes.140 An interpretational method that respects statutory
purpose should lead to results that in turn engender respect for the
statute itself and what it attempts to do. Its logic will become under-
standable and, once understood, more likely of appreciation.
A literal reading of the statute, without reference to and often
without regard for purpose, cannot help but sometimes thwart purpose
138. See id. at 173, 217 N.W.2d at 505.
139. Id. at 172, 217 N.W.2d at 504.
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and lead to results that appear irrational. If that occurs, if the out-
growth of the statute does at times seem irrational, it is the statute itself
that suffers. It suffers in application, for to the groups that it governs it
becomes a nuisance, a series of arbitrary rules that through careful
navigation can sometimes be evaded. And it suffers in adjudication, for
if the literal application of one provision leads to a nonsensical result, a
court may be tempted to offer a strained interpretation of another
provision, thereby avoiding the irrationality, but at the possible expense
of the statute.
140. In a decision announced as this Article went to press, the court of appeals de-
cided News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Board of Education for Wake County,
29 N.C. App. 37 (1976). The court addressed three questions raised by this Article.
First, it held that a requirement of public notice was implicit in the open-meetings stat-
ute. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. Second, on a purely textual analysis,
it held that the personnel exception did not permit a board to meet in closed session
to consider or fill a vacancy on the board itself. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
Third, the court indicated that a board otherwise subject to the statute might in certain
circumstances avail itself of the investigative committee exception by resolving itself into
a committee of the whole. See text accompanying note 91 supra. Unfortunately, the
court gave little indication of what sorts of investigations by a committee of the whole
could properly be closed, simply announcing that the meeting in question-held to fill
a vacancy on the defendant school board-was not one.
The court also addressed a question not raised in this Article. It held that implicit
in the staute was a prohibition on voting by secret ballot on matters required to be dis-
cussed in open, unless the ballots, showing how each member voted, were made public.

